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Cross-Border Insolvency in the U.S. and U.K.:
Conflicting Approaches to Defining the Locus
of a Debtor's "Center of Main Interests"
BRYAN ROCHELLE

I. Introduction
In order to take up a "foreign"' corporate insolvency case in the United
States (U.S.) or the United Kingdom (U.K.), courts have to determine that a
"foreign main proceeding" is pending in a country where the debtor has its
"center of main interests" ("COMI"). Unfortunately, neither the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code2 nor the U.K Cross-Border Insolvency Regulation,3 the
prevailing laws in each jurisdiction, defines COMI. This lack of clarity has
left courts on both sides of the proverbial "pond" with the task of
4
formulating definitions of their own. U.K. courts, at least, have been
remarkably consistent in this endeavor, reaching the near consensus that
COMI should be evaluated by asking where a third party, assessing certain
objective factors, would perceive the corporate debtor to conduct the bulk of
its business operations.s Some U.S. courts, for their part, have reached the
same conclusion.6 However, other U.S. courts have tied COMI to the
* J.D. Candidate 2017, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law. This
article is dedicated to the memory of my late grandfather, William J. Rochelle, Jr. I thank
Jennifer Little and Trevor Spears for their efforts in shepherding this article toward publication.
1. Note that the word "foreign," for purposes of discussing U.K.-based cross-border
insolvency proceedings in this paper, means actions brought in the U.K. by parties residing
outside of the European Union (EU). "Foreign" retains a more natural meaning in examining
U.S.-based cross-border bankruptcy cases here, describing cases involving parties and
jurisdictions located outside of the U.S.
2. 11 U.S.C. < 101 et seq.
3. The Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1030 (Gr. Brit.).
4. Instead of moving towards a consensus on a definition of COMI in recent years, courts
have exerted considerable effort attempting to ascertain the time at which COMI should be
measured. Courts have tended to resolve this question in one of two ways. First, as in In re
Betcorp, 400 B.R. 266, 290-91 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2009), courts have held that a debtor's COMI
should be measured as of the date of the petition for recognition instead of the date of the
opening of the foreign insolvency proceeding. Second, and by contrast, in In re Millenium
Global Emerging Credit Master Fund Ltd., 458 B.R. 63, 74 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011), affd, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88782 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2012), the court held that the proper date to
measure COMI is the time the foreign insolvency proceeding commenced. While a consensus
on the temporal nature of COMI has yet to be resolved, courts appear to be even further behind
in terms of arriving at a definition of the term itself.
5. See, e.g., In re Stanford Int'l Bank Ltd. [2010] EWCA 137 (Civ) 184.
6. See, e.g., In re SPhinx, Ltd., 351 B.R. 103, 117-18, 351 B.R. 103, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

392

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 50, NO. 2

debtor's "nerve center," or "principal place of business"-its corporate
headquarters.7
The succeeding pages will examine the case law defining COMI in the
U.S. and U.K. While the Model Law was created in large measure to
promote cooperation in cross-border insolvency cases regardless of the
forum in which they were being heard,8 courts have moved away from this
aim, creating discrete definitions of COMI based on the different sources
employed to define the term.
H.

Legal Background

A.

THE EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW

REGULATION AND THE

In 1997, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) adopted the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (the
"Model Law").9 The Model Law was ratified in that same year by the
United Nations General Assembly, and, as of this writing, has been ratified
in dozens of states and jurisdictions,io including the U.S. (2005)" and U.K.
(2006).12 The Model Law's purpose is to work as a procedural mechanismto be incorporated into local insolvency laws-through which debtors and
creditors can seek redress in various separate national forums.13 The law
covers four principal sets of circumstances: (1) "inbound" requests for
recognition and assistance of a foreign insolvency case; (2) "outbound"
requests by one country that another country recognize a pending case in
the former; (3) coordination of proceedings occurring simultaneously in two
or more countries; and (4) foreign creditor participation in pending cases.14
7.
WL
8.
9.

See, e.g., In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 440 B.R. 60 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), decision afld, 2011
4357421 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), affd, 714 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2013).
Model Law, art. 28.
G.A. Res. 52/158, U.N. Doc. A/Res/52/158 (Jan. 30, 1998), UNCITRAL MoDELs LAW

ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WTH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT (MODEL LAw), available at

http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral texts/insolvency/1997Model.htrnL The Model Law itself was
based on a predecessor international law, the EU Insolvency Treaty.
See EU Regulation,
Council Regulation 1346/2000 European Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, 2000

OJ.(L 160), at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriSery.do?uri=CELEX:32000R1346
:en:HTML.
10. The following countries have adopted the Model Law: Australia (2008), Canada (2005),
Chile (2013), Colombia (2006), Greece (2010), Japan (2000), Kenya (2015), Malawi (2015),
Mauritius (2009), Mexico (2000), Montenegro (2002), New Zealand (2006), Philippines
(2010),
Poland (2003), Republic of Korea (2006), Romania (2002), Serbia (2004), Seychelles
(2013),
Slovenia (2007), South Africa (2000), Uganda (2011), Great Britain (2006), United States
(2005), and Vanuatu (2013). See UNICTRAL website at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral-texts/insolvency/1997Model-status.html.

11. Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 801, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
12. Cross-Border Insolvency Regulation 2006.
13. G.A. Res. 52/158, U.N. Doc. A/Res/52/158 (Jan. 30, 1998), MODEL LAw,

1 20.

14. G.A. Res. 52/158, MODEL LAW GUIDE To ENACTMENT, supra note 9, 1 22.
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Just as the Model Law injects order and predictability into cross-border
insolvency proceedings, its prescriptions are drawn to account for the unique
nature of local laws and procedures.15 Obtaining recognition under the
Model Law affords debtors the equivalent of an automatic stay from creditor
collection actions.16 Debtors, however, lose the right to transfer or
encumber assets that their creditors hope will serve as the source of
repayment of debts owed to them.17 Moreover, embedded in the statute are
a number of exceptions and limitations benefitting creditors, who are
permitted to oppose recognition after the fact.18 Creditors further enjoy
enhanced notice of foreign recognition.19 And courts, for their part, may
modify or dispense with relief as permitted by the law.20

B.

CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY IN THE

U.S.

AND

U.K.

In the U.S., the Model Law took the form of Chapter 15 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code (the Code).21 Utilizing Chapter 15, a "foreign
representative"22 can file for recognition of a foreign insolvency proceeding
in a U.S. court under section 1515.23 Under Chapter 15, a U.S. court may
cooperate with a foreign counterpart by hearing either a "foreign main
proceeding"24 or a "foreign non-main proceeding."25 Under section 1502(4)
of the Code, a "foreign main proceeding" means one "pending in the
country where the debtor has the center of its main interests"-commonly
referred to as its "COM1."26 The Code specifies, under section 1516(c),
that, "[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, the debtor's registered
office, . . . is presumed to be the [COMI]."27
As explained in In re Ti-Continental Exchange Ltd., "[i]n effect, the
registered office (or place of incorporation) is evidence that is probative of,
and that may in the absence of other evidence be accepted as a proxy for,
15. G.A. Res. 52/158, MODEL LAw, supra note 9, arts. 25-27.
16. Id. art. 20.
17. Id.
18. Id. art. 21.
19. Id. art. 14.
20. Id. arts. 17(4), 22(3).
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a) ("[t]he purpose of this chapter is to incorporate the Model Law
. . . so as to provide effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency");
H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (2005) (Chapter 15 was meant "to provide
effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency" and to serve as the
"exclusive door to ancillary assistance to foreign proceedings, thus concentrat[ing] control of
these questions in one court").
22. Id. at §§ 101(24), 1515.
23. Id. at §§ 1504, 1515; see, e.g., United States v. J.A. Jones Const. Group, LLC, 333 BR. 637,
638-39 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
24. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(23), 1502(4).
25. Id. at § 1521(c).
26. Id. at U.S.C. § 1502(4).
27. Id. at § 1516(c); see also In re Ti-ContinentalExchange Ltd., 349 BR. 627, 635 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. 2006).
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'center of main interests."'28 But "[t]he registered office . . . does not
otherwise have special evidentiary value and does not shift the risk of
nonpersuasion, i.e., the burden of proof, away from the foreign
representative seeking recognition as a main proceeding."29 The court
observed that the legislative history provided additional insight to section
1516(c), noting that "the presumption that the place of the registered office
is also the center of the debtor's main interest is included for speed and
convenience of proof where there is no serious controvery";30 the presumption
"permits and encourages fast action in cases where speed may
be essential,
while leaving the debtor's true 'center' open to dispute in cases where the
facts are doubtful."31 But the presumption is not the "preferred alternative"
in situations where "a separation between a corporation's jurisdiction of
incorporation and its real seat" exists.32
Meanwhile, in the U.K, the Model Law was implemented by the CrossBorder Insolvency Regulations 2006 (CBIR).33 Instead of carving out an
entirely new statutory section within a previously existing portion of the
U.K. insolvency scheme,34 legislators proclaimed that the Model Law would
"have the force of law,"35 and appended it to the CBIR,36 albeit "with certain
modifications to adapt it for application in Great Britain."37 Similar to
Chapter 15, there is a presumption under the CBIR that the locale of the
company's registered office is one and the same as its COMI.38 Again, this
presumption is rebuttable.39

28. Tri-ContinentalExchange, 349 B.R. at 635.

29. Id.
30. See H.R. Rep. No. 31, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. 1516 (2005), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 2005, pp. 88, 175.
31. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Locating the Eye of the FinancialStorm, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 3,

15 (2007).
32. Bear Stearns, 374 B.R. at 129; see also Westbrook, FinancialStorm, 32

BROOK. J. INT'L L. at
15.
33. The Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1030 (Gr. Brit.).
34. Unlike their counterparts in the United States, courts in the U.K must navigate not just
one-but four-principle sources of law in order to determine the applicable law in any given
insolvency case. These sources are: (1) The European Commission Regulation on Insolvency
Proceedings (EC Regulation); (2) the Cross Border Insolvency Regulations 2006, which
implements the Model Law (CBIR); (3) the Insolvency Act of 1986 (Insolvency Act); and (4) the
common law. See EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (No. 1346/2000); Cross-Border
Insolvency Regulations 2006; The Insolvency Act 1986, s. 426 (Gr. Brit). It is an open question
which of these sources will remain instructive in U.K courts after the "Brexit."

35. CBIR, SI 2006/1030, § 2(1).
36. Id. Schedule 1.

37. Id. at § 2(1).
38. Id. Schedule 1 (citing Model Law, art. 16(3)).

39. Id.
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Developments and Problems

Courts in the U.S. and U.K. have taken different approaches to defining
COMI: (1) the "nerve center" (or "principal place of business") test- and (2)
the "objective third party" analysis.41

A.

THE

"NERVE CENTER" (OR "PRINCIAL PLACE OF BusINEss")

TEST

In the U.S., one COMI definition stems from the familiar notion of
"principal place of business"-a term that some courts have equated to
"center of main interests."42 From its earliest use, courts have used the
corporate headquarters as the defining feature of the debtor's COMI. In
one early case, In re Ti-Continental Exchange Ltd., the court used the
"principal place of business" test to determine that the COMI of certain
debtor insurance companies was St. Vincent and the Grenadines; it therefore
granted recognition of the case as a foreign main proceeding under Chapter
15.43 The court reached this conclusion even though the debtors had
engaged in the vast majority of their fraudulent activities in the U.S. and
Canada. More important for the court were other factors, including the
debtors' organization as international business companies in St. Vincent and
the Grenadines, where they conducted regular business operations at their
registered offices in Kingstown, St. Vincent. These facts, the court found,
suggested that the debtor-insurer's "principal place of business" was one and
the same as its COMI.- After the Ti-Continental decision, the "principal
place of business" analysis gained further refinement, but it did not come
from the bankruptcy courts.
Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court served as the prime mover. In Hertz v.
Friend,4s the Court used American legal conceptions of the "principal place
of business" to define it as the corporate "nerve center," or headquarters. In
Hertz, the Court considered a class-action suit by certain California citizens
who alleged that a corporation headquartered in New Jersey had violated
California's wage and hour laws.4< Ruling for the plaintiffs, the Court held
that the "principal place of business" in the federal diversity jurisdiction
statute refers to the place where a corporation's officers "direct, control, and
coordinate the corporation's activities"-in other words, its "nerve center."47
40. See, e.g., In re FairfieldSentry, 440 B.R. 60 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
41. See, e.g., In re Stanford Int'l Bank Ltd. [2010] EWCA 137 (Gr. Brit.).
42. See, e.g., In re British American Ins. Co. Ltd., 425 B.R. 884, 908-09 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010);
In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd., 374 B.R. 122, 129
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), affd, 389 B.R. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Ti-ContinentalExchangeLtd.,
349 B.R. 627, 633 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006).
43. In re Tri-ContinentalExchange Ltd., 349 B.R. at 629.
44. Id.
45. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1029 (2009).
46. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 81.
47. Id. at 92-93.
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Normally, the Court added, this place should be the locus of the
corporation's headquarters, so long as the headquarters serves as the "actual
center of direction, control, and coordination . .. [and] not simply an office
where the corporation holds its board meetings."48
Following the Hertz decision, some bankruptcy courts have equated a
company's COMI with its "nerve center," or headquarters.9 In one
frequently-cited case, In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., the court applied this
analysis to hold that the debtors' base of operations-its COMI-was the
British Virgin Islands rather than the U.S.so Reaching this conclusion, the

court found that the debtors had effectively quit operating in New York
more than eighteen months before filing the recognition petition in the
U.S., and seven months before commencing the foreign insolvency
proceedings.51 Moreover, after ceasing operations, the debtors made most of
their administrative decisions from the British Virgin Islands.52

B.

THE

"OBJECTIVE

TI-IRD PARTY"

TEST

U.K. courts' construction of COMI conflicts with that of their U.S.
counterparts in large measure because of the legal sources from which they
have interpreted this term. Rather than understanding COMI as a purely
common law principle, U.K. jurists have looked to other significant
domestic cross-border insolvency law-the European Union Regulation on
Insolvency Proceedings (EC Regulation)-which applies to all EU Member
States (Member States) except for Denmark.5 Although the EC Regulation
does not extend beyond EU borders, U.K. courts have considered it
persuasive because it shares certain common assumptions with the Model
Law, including the COMI concept. 54 Much like a "foreign main
proceeding" in the CBIR, in the EC Regulation a "main proceeding" can
only be opened in a Member State if that state is the corporate debtor's
COMI.55 Unlike the CBIR, the EC Regulation defines COMI as-if not the
situs of the company's registered office (here, too, a foreign representative
must overcome a rebuttable presumption)-the location a third party would
perceive as being the center of the debtor's operations.s6 While U.S. courts
diverge in their construction of COMI, courts in the U.K. presently are of
48. Id. at 93.
49. See, e.g., In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 440 B.R. 60 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd, 2011 WL
4357421 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), affd, 714 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2013).
50. In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 440 B.R. 60, 64-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
5 1. Id.
52. Id.
53. EU Regulation, Council Regulation 1346/2000 European Union Regulation on
Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 OJ. (L 160).
54. See EC Regulation, arts. 12-14, 17.
55. See id. art. 12.
56. See EC Regulation, art. 3(1), Preamble 1 13; see also Case 341/04, In re Eurofood IFSC Ltd.,
(1 33), 2006 E.C.R. 1-3813.
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one mind in construing the term:57 consistent with the EC Regulation, they
seem more concerned with how the debtor's pre-insolvency activities
appeared to third parties.5
The European Court of Justice's decision in In re Eurofood IFSC Ltd serves
as the principal authority through which U.K. courts have subsequently
applied the third party test to cases invoking the CBIR.59 In Eurofood, the
European Court of Justice held that COMI "must be identified by reference
to criteria that are both objective and ascertainable by third parties," and that
"objectivity and that possibility of ascertainment by third parties are
necessary in order to ensure legal certainty and foreseeability concerning the
determination of the court with jurisdiction to open main insolvency
proceedings."60 Seizing on this analysis, the court in In re StanfordInt'l Bank
Ltd. held that an objective observer's perceptions of the debtor's activities
should be the controlling element in determining COMI for CBIR purposes
because "it provides certainty and foreseeability for creditors of the company
at the time they enter into a transaction."61 In so holding, the court reversed
its previous ruling in In re Lennox Holdings pik, where it found that
determining the "head office" was determinative of COMI.62 The court
preferred the objective, third party perception test, which it said "provide[d]
certainty and foreseeability for creditors of the company at the time they
enter into a transaction."63 In a later case, In re Kaupthing CapitalPartnersH,
the court observed that it "is to have regard to factors already in the public
domain, or which would be apparent to a typical third party doing business
with the body, excluding such matters as might only be ascertained on
inquiry."-

As discussed above, some U.S. courts have interpreted COMI to mean the
"principal place of business" or "nerve center" of a corporate debtor;
however, another line of U.S. case law both acknowledges and applies the
objective third party analysis set forth in the EC Regulation, Eurofood, and its
progeny. 65 In an early case looking to these U.K. sources in the U.S., In re
57. Notably, some U.K courts have cast doubt on the appropriateness of a "nerve center" or
"head office" test to determine a debtor's COMI. For instance, in In re Kaupthing Capital
PartnersH Master LP, Inc., [2011] B.C.C. 338, 342, the court stated that, "the place where the
body's head office functions are carried out is only relevant if so ascertainable by third parties."
58. See, e.g., Kaupthing Capital, [2011] B.C.C. 338.
59. Case 341/04 (1 33), In re Eurofood IFSC Ltd., 2006 ECR 1-3813.
60. Id.
61. In re Stanford Int'l Bank Ltd., [2010] EWCA (Civ) 137; see also In re Lennox Holdings pk

[2008] EWHC B11 (Ch).
62. In re Lennox Holdings plc, [2008] EWHC B 11 (Ch).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., In re British American Isle of Venice (BVI), Ltd., 441 B.R. 713, 720 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
2010); In re FairfieldSentry Ltd., 2011 WL 4357421, *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), affd, 714 F.3d 127 (2d.
Cit. 2013); In re Ran, 607 F.3d 1017, 1023, 53 (5th Cit. 2010); In re Millennium GlobalEmerging
Credit Master Fund Ltd., 458 B.R. 63, 76-77 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011), afld, 474 B.R. 88
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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SPhinx, Ltd., the court concluded that while the presumption of the debtor's
COMI is its place of registration or incorporation, various factors could
nevertheless rebut it, including: the location of the debtor's headquarters;
the location of those who "actually manage" the debtor (which may be one
and the same as the headquarters); the location of the debtor's primary
assets; the location of the majority of the debtor's creditors, or of a majority
of creditors; the law of the most applicable jurisdiction; and the perception
of third parties.66 Other courts subsequently followed.67
Drawing on SPhinx, the court in In re British American Insurance Co., Ltd.
found that although the debtor was incorporated in the Bahamas (and its
judicial manager was appointed there), the Bahamas were not its COMI.68
The court reached this conclusion based in part on the fact that the debtor's
headquarters were located in Trinidad, where the debtor's subsidiary
conducted its financial, administrative, actuarial, legal, policy,
administration, and claims processing. Further, the subsidiary's employees
managed the day-to-day affairs of the company. Moreover, the majority of
the debtor's assets were located in its Eastern Caribbean branches, while its
creditors were located outside of the Bahamas.69 Finally, its policyholders
and creditors were unlikely to perceive that the debtor's operational hub was
in the Bahamas given that its business was not conducted there.70 Therefore,
the Bahamas proceeding did not fall within the definition of a "foreign main
proceeding."71 In an even earlier case, In re Bear Stearns High-Grade
Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd., the court used the same
analysis to reject a foreign main proceeding designation of a "letterbox"
limited liability company whose registered office was located in the Cayman
Islands.72 The court reached this conclusion because the company had no
employees or managers in the Cayman Islands. Rather, both its investment
manager and administrator were based in the U.S., along with its books and
records, and all of the company's liquid assets.73
By contrast, in In re BritishAmerican Isle of Venice (BI7) Ltd., the court used
the aforementioned factors to find that the debtor's COMI was the British
66. In re SPhinx, Ltd., 351 B.R. 103, 117-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
67. See, e.g., In re British American Insurance Co. Ltd., 425 BR. 884, 909, 52 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
286 (S.D. Fla. 2010). In deciding whether to grant recognition of a foreign main proceeding of
a Chapter 15 petitioner in the Bahamas, the court weighed several non-exclusive factors,
including the location of: the debtor's headquarters; those who "actually manage the debtor,"
which may be one and the same as the headquarters; the debtor's "primary assets"; the majority
of the debtor's creditors, or a majority of the creditors potentially "affected" by the case; and
finally, the jurisdiction "whose law would apply to most disputes." In addition, the Court
considered the "expectations of third parties with regard to the location of a debtor's COMI"
68. Id. at 911-12.
69. Id.
70. Id.
7 1. Id.
72. In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit StrategiesMaster Fund, Ltd., 374 B.R. 122

(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
73. Id.

CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY IN U.S & U.K

2017]

399

Virgin Islands because the corporation (as well as its liquidator, who had
managed the debtor and its subsidiaries for a year prior to the filing for
recognition) was formed, registered, and headquartered there-along with
more than 80 percent of its total assets, its books and records, and registered
agent.74 In another case, In re Millenium Global Emerging CreditMaster Fund
Limited, the court recognized a foreign main proceeding, holding that the
debtor's COMI was Bermuda-although some factors "point[ed]" toward
other locales.75 The court noted that two of the debtors' three directors
were located in Bermuda.76 These directors had the right to replace all of
the debtors' other agents, and to determine whether to place the funds into
an insolvency proceeding. Moreover, the funds' bank, their custodian, and
auditors also resided there.77 Thus, without management, investors,
creditors, or property in Bermuda, the court found that the debtors' COMI
was Bermuda.78

IV.

Conclusion

Agreement has not yet emerged both domestically and internationally on
the proper definition of COMI. While the Model Law was intended to
usher in international cooperation in cross-border cases, 79 Courts in both the
U.S. and U.K. have been anything but harmonious in their interpretation of
a key term. The basis for disagreement results primarily from the conscious
choice of individual jurists to adhere to either American common law
notions like "principal place of business" and the corporate "nerve center,"
or the European, statute-based concept of third party perception of objective
factors. Additional fragmentation may well occur going forward: one has to
wonder, for example, whether U.K. courts will continue to look to EU law
in light of last year's "Brexit."
Regardless of the merits and drawbacks in the current approaches, the lack
of agreement on defining COMI goes against the purposes of the Model
Law. Achieving the uniformity consistent with the Model Law's aims will
ultimately require action by the law's drafters, and by lawmakers in the U.S.
and the U.K.

74. In re British American Isle of Venice (BVI), Ltd., 441 B.R. 713, 720 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
75. In re Millennium Global Emerging Credit Master Fund Limited, 458 B.R. 63, 77 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
76. Millennium, 458 B.R. at 77.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. G.A. Res. 52/158, MODEL LAW, supra note 9, art. 28.

